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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would be more equitable for the courts to hold-that upon the
remarriage of the plaintiff, the continuing obligation having terminated and the absolute right to alimony being abrogated, the separation agreement, in so far as it provides for future support and
maintenance, should also terminate. In the instant case, the Court
expressly refrained from giving an opinion as to the wife's right
to support under the contract. 4
P. V. M., JR.

INFANTS-CONFESSION MADE BY DELINQUENT
WARNING OF SELF-INCRIINATION-PiPOPER.-The

Boy WITHOUT
defendant in-

fant under the age of sixteen years broke into a store and stole
$12.00. He was charged in Children's Court with juvenile delinquency. The hearing, which was held in the Children's Court, was
as follows: The boy was present in company with his mother,
sister, and the family clergyman. Before the boy was questioned
by the judge, he was advised, as well as the others present, that he
might have the aid of counsel if he or the others so desired. The
testimony of the boy sustained the charge beyond any doubt; indeed
there was a full admission and no attempt at denial. The boy was
thereupon adjudged a delinquent child and was committed to a State
Industrial School. On appeal, held, juvenile delinquency proceeding
not being a criminal one, there was neither right to nor necessity
for procedural safeguards prescribed by the Constitution and Statute1
People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353 (1932).
2
No act or omission is a crime except as prescribed by Statute.
As the power to declare what act or omission is a crime rests solely
with the Legislature, there is no doubt that it has the power to
declare that an act done by a child shall not be a crime, although
the same act, if committed by an adult, would be a crime.3 Under
Statute 4 the concept of crime and punishment disappears where an
act or omission of an infant under sixteen years would be a crime
if he were an adult. All suggestion and taint of criminality was
intended to be and has been done away with by Statute. 5 For the
Severance v. Severance, instant case, at 433, 183 N. E. at 909.
of N. Y. (1930) §45.
(1909) §22-People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373, 99 N. E.
841 (1912).
'Supra
note 1.
SIbid.
5 Supra note 1, par. 8: "This act shall be construed to the end that the care,
custody and discipline of the children brought before the Court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and
that as far as practicable they shall be treated not as criminals but as children
in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."
"

1 Children's Ct. Act
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW
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purposes of this case, the fundamental point is that the proceeding
was not a criminal one. The state was not seeking to punish a
malefactor, it was seeking to salvage a boy who was in danger of
becoming one. In other words, the problem for determination by
the judge is not--"Has this boy committed a specific wrong?"
but "What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best
be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career?" 6 As Statute 7 declares the act committed by the boy was not a crime, there was no need to warnhim of self-incrimination at the time he made his confession and
the confession is binding evidence.
J. J. L.
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PRISONER COMMITTED FOR CONTEMPT-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.One Joseph S. Alberti, an executor, was adjudged in contempt of
court for wrongfully neglecting to make certain payments under
his mother's will as directed by the surrogate. These payments
exceeded $16,000, some $6,000 of which were due plaintiffs. Pur.suant to the contempt order, a warrant was issued in the usual
form, relating the sums due, the persons to whom owed, and that
commitment was to last until payments were made. Six months
after Alberti's arrest, the sheriff, defendant in this action, released
him without getting the required money. Held, sheriff liable to
plaintiffs to the extent of their damage, namely the $6,000 with
interest. Bijou et al. v. Jacoby et al., 260 N. Y. 289, 183 N. E. 428
(1932).
The Judiciary Law 1 provides that if actual loss is produced
by reason of misconduct of a person adjudged guilty of contempt
of court, "a fine sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party must
be imposed upon the offender, collected, and paid over to the aggrieved party under direction of the court." Thus, once misconduct has been established (as in the instant case by the surrogate),
the only question remaining is the determination of the amount due
in terms of the fine.2 This must be the actual damage suffered,3
as shown from the extent of the impairment or prejudice caused, 4
'Mack, The Juvenile Court (1909) 23 HARv. L. REv. 104.
'Supra note 1.
'N. Y. JuDIcIARY LAW (1909) §773.
' Brill v. Brill, 148 App. Div. 63, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1030 (1st Dept. 1911).
'Supra note 1; Bernstein v. McCahill, 56 Misc.. 460, 107 N. Y. Supp. 161

(1907).

'People v. Reid, 139 App. Div. 551, 124 N. Y. Supp. 205 (1st Dept. 1910).

